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Abstract: 
We develop a model of commercial gestational surrogacy in which a childless couple approaches 
a prospective surrogate, who is willing to gestate for the couple. The surrogate’s care is non-
contractible. We show that if the surrogate doesn’t have any wealth, at the optimum, she is 
always found to put in sub-optimal effort. Put differently, the surrogate cannot be made a 
residual claimant and therefore eliciting first best care is never optimal. Therefore the paper, in a 
hidden action framework, formalizes this ‘inefficiency’ inherent in the Indian ‘rent-a-womb’ 
market.  
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1. Introduction: 
       "They need their child.…………... I need the money." 
                                                                                       -An Indian Surrogate1  
Commercial surrogacy, or “wombs for rent,” is a growing business in India.  Increasing numbers 
of infertile couples from the U.S, Singapore, Britain, Taiwan, Nordic and other countries are 
flocking to India in search of prospective surrogates for their would be babies. India provides an 
English-speaking environment and cheaper services as attractive incentives for those exploring 
surrogacy as a fertility option. While India is becoming a preferred medical tourism destination 
in many ways, the issue of wealthy foreigners paying poor Indian surrogates to have babies has 
raised ethical concerns in many Indian minds about some parts of India becoming “baby 
factories”. While in India commercial surrogacy is not illegal per se, there is yet no legislation 
that dictates a code of conduct of the mushrooming infertility clinics allover India.  India has 
decent guidelines in ART (ICMR, 2004), but the industry for infertility treatment lacks proper 
legal structure and legal clarity regarding the transfer of parental rights and entitlement of 
nationality, among others.2 
                But what is surrogate motherhood? According to the Merriam-Webster online 
dictionary, a surrogate mother is defined as “a woman who becomes pregnant usually by 
artificial insemination or surgical implantation of a fertilized egg for the purpose of carrying the 
foetus to term for another woman, who is medically incapable of doing so.” Therefore a 
surrogate mother is one who carries a baby and gives birth, for another woman who cannot 
conceive and/or carry a baby successfully. The couple, who hire a surrogate, are known as the 
                                                        
1
 Reported at  http://www.sfgate.com/local/bayarea/item/India-surrogacy-Chapter-One-23858.php. Similar reports 
are cited at CNN, Asia, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/03/world/asia/india-surrogate-mother-industry/ . 
2
 For more, see Smerdon (2008). 
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intended parents or the commissioning couple (ACOG 2004). There are two kinds of surrogacy: 
(i) straight (natural/ traditional) and (ii) gestational (or host). 
 To explain briefly, in straight surrogacy, the sperm of the intended father is used to 
inseminate the surrogate and therefore, the surrogate becomes both the genetic and gestational 
mother. While the intended father is also the genetic father, the intended mother is only a rearing 
mother (ACOG 2004)3. In gestational surrogacy, the egg and sperm of intended parents are 
fertilized externally and the embryo transferred to the uterus of the surrogate. This process is 
known as In-vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer (henceforth IVF-ET). Here, the surrogate is 
only a gestational carrier and the intended parents are the biological (or genetic) parents4 5. From 
a legal standpoint  surrogacy contracts can be of broad two types – ‘altruistic’ where no money is 
paid to the surrogates for her ‘services’ (mainly in excess of necessary medical expenses) and 
‘commercial’ where money (or incentives) is paid to the surrogates for her ‘services’ (in excess 
of medical expenses). 
           There are a large number of issues regarding the institution of surrogacy that can be 
addressed: Whether the institution is a ‘godsend’ for childless couples or a threat to the very 
fabric of society? Does it allow fertile women to fulfill a social responsibility, or does it lead to 
commoditization of women?  Issues like whether or not such markets should be prohibited 
outright or regulated6, should the payment to a surrogate be banned7 so that the service remains 
                                                        
3
 For more details, see ICMR 2004, www. ivf-infertility.com 
4
 For more details, see ICMR 2004, www. ivf-infertility.com 
5
 We ignore the case where donor sperm is combined with donor or surrogate eggs because the child is not 
genetically related to intended parents.  
6
 For regulation and ethical guidelines in Australia refer to Government of Australia (2007), Australian Government 
(2007), Ethical guidelines on the use of assisted reproductive technology in clinical practice and research. 
7
 For example in UK payments in excess of medical expenses i.e. incentive payments are strictly prohibited (For 
legal guidelines on surrogacy practices and legislation in UK, visit 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/22/pdfs/ukpga_20080022_en.pdf). 
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altruistic, what the ‘sacredness’ of human life means in an economic context, can be discussed at 
large. But in this paper we abstract from such issues.8 
         In this paper, we specifically focus on the optimal organization of surrogacy contracts and 
the inherent inefficiency using a bilateral contracting structure between a set of Intended Parents 
and a poor Surrogate. We show that since the surrogate is poor and doesn’t have any wealth and 
given the nature of the output, it is not optimal for the intended parents to offer a contract that 
makes the surrogate a residual claimant of the surplus. Instead the intended parents should 
optimally offer a share-type contract and this will optimally lead to sub-optimal investment by 
the surrogate9. Therefore the paper tries to formalize the idea that under-investment will be an 
inherent feature of the ‘rent-a-womb’ industry in India where surrogates come from poor and 
humble background. The structure we use is a hidden action model with limited liability. Note, 
that in this paper without loss of generality, we focus on commercial gestational surrogacy 
contracts only10 where it is assumed that money can be paid to the surrogate for her ‘services’ 
either legally (or illegally) and the ethical and/or legal aspect is not the focus of this paper.  
      Our paper is related to the contract theoretic literature on the ‘womb market’ (Banerjee 
(2013), Banerjee and Basu (2009))11. Banerjee (2013) addressed the debate on whether a 
surrogacy institution should be “Commercial or Altruistic’. Using the classic moral hazard 
framework with limited liability he analyzed conditions under which a surrogacy contract should 
be commercial or altruistic. Also, Banerjee and Basu (2009) in an incomplete contracting 
framework showed that if child specific care is non-contractible then surrogates optimally invest 
less (take less care) than the first-best. Couples are also more likely to choose low-type 
                                                        
8
 For more on ethical discussions on surrogacy markets see Ergas, (2004), Posner (1989). 
9
 For a similar kind of idea but in a different context see Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak,( 2002).  
10
 Other forms of surrogacy can also be analyzed under this structure with slight modification. 
11
  See Hatzis (2003) for a general equilibrium approach on surrogacy.  
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surrogates, who need less compensation for foregoing cheaper outside options. Hence the 
popular practice of making surrogacy contracts unenforceable might be counterproductive and 
puts the unborn child at risk. 
      Some comparison of this paper with the Banerjee (2013) paper is warranted at this point. In 
Banerjee (2013) the surrogate suffered from a feeling of social ignominy from commercial 
motive and that let the surrogate to put in sub-optimal effort irrespective of whether limited 
liability was binding or not12. Therefore social ignominy was sufficient to generate inefficiency 
in that model. Whereas in this paper we do not have anything like social ignominy, but 
inefficiency still arises out of the fact that the surrogate doesn’t have any wealth. Also in this 
paper the limited liability constraint always binds at the optimum. 
 
2. The reproductive industry in India-Some issues and trends: 
Suboptimal Care: 
In India, the temptation of a poor women to become a surrogate can be entirely blamed on the very low 
level of daily income. The average daily income of the non-agricultural rural population is as low as Rs. 
48 (for women) and Rs. 71(for men) a day.13 A house-hold of minimum four members can scarcely be 
sustained with this income. Leave aside the need for education, better nutrition or else, a large section of 
the rural population in India can hardly avail four meals a day. It is this economically marginalized group 
who sees surrogacy as a brilliant opportunity to improve their livelihood. The widespread notion about 
surrogates being overwhelmed to offer infertile couples the joy of parenthood is an exaggeration. 
Strikingly, the reality is women offer their services as surrogates in the anticipation of a better livelihood. 
Given, an alternative avenue of income they confess “not to prefer working as surrogates.”14  
                                                        
12
 In fact there was a case where limited liability didn’t bind at the optimum. 
13
 Consult Indiastat for detailed report, available at http://www.indiastat.com/searchresult.aspx. 
14  
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It will be an injustice to blame the surrogates for putting in suboptimal effort in caring for the fetus, or 
considering surrogacy as a secondary choice. Rather this attitude may be traced back to various other 
reasons.  
Experts feel it is best to separate the surrogates’ motherhood emotions from the “job” (of substituting for 
the genetic mother in bearing the pregnancy) and in the process generates a psychology in the surrogate 
that subdues the best care she could have given to the child. The rationale is the surrogate would start to 
feel a motherly connection to the child and may become reluctant to give up the child. These women are 
poor and less aware, and needs an elaborate psychological as well as physical grooming in order to adjust 
to the complex emotions that may be attached with such projects. But, the industry provides a very feeble 
foundation to the ‘making of surrogate mothers’. Also, not only she bears the child but also must undergo 
physical treatments that would alter their biological routines completely. It is an ordeal to make the body 
realize that it is pregnant through artificial procedures and these efforts of the surrogates go neglected in 
case of the Indian surrogates. She is paid much less than the foreign surrogate. So, the foreign 
counterparts are more ready and willing to undergo the effort that is required as she is sufficiently 
compensated. The Indian surrogates are ignorant and are offered little incentive to give that extra effort. 
This, as most critics call is ‘exploitation of the wombs’. 
The Indian surrogates receive lower compensation if an abortion is desired by the Commissioning Couple 
mid-way into the course of the surrogate’s pregnancy. Often cases have been cited where bearing twins 
would fetch them less than double compensation. No particular settlement is made on the maximum 
number of IVF cycles to be undergone by each surrogate. Contracts are misleading and contain 
incomplete information towards the rights of the surrogate. Often surrogates’ health is put at risk due to 
multiple pregnancy or repeated IVF cycles. The surrogates are not covered for these risks. It would have 
been more appropriate to penalize the Commissioning Couple for frivolously desiring an abortion and 
compensating the surrogate more for bearing physical uncertainties. So, there are conflicts in the degree 
of discretion to be given to each party and its consequences upon the welfare distribution among the 
parties.  Rather, this industry applies ‘consumer sovereignty’ as it applies to all other commercial market 
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transactions even at the cost of depleting the surrogates’ state of health. But, this market exceeds the 
boundaries of the commonly perceived commodity markets. Hence, the general attitude towards the rights 
and rewards of the surrogates must be altered in order to fit the special requirements of this industry.   
           The Indian contracts usually overlook the insurance requirements of the Surrogate. Most contracts 
have no provision to compensate the death or damage to health caused due to the pregnancy. This is a 
criticized point in the design of the contracts. Even when the surrogate’s risk is covered, there is little 
chance and capability that she will challenge the non-payment of the insurance in court. Certainly, since 
India has no implementable legislation hence violation of the recommended contract is hardly a folly 
under the given circumstances. 
The surrogate is made to feel almost like she has  been just ‘employed’ and hence it is justified that she 
does  not feel the level of responsibility towards the fetus like it could have been if she was made a part of 
the pregnancy. Neither is the surrogate justifiably compensated to allow her to understand that whatever 
hardships she undergoes it earns her a wage. Hence, if rightly compensated, it could have been possible to 
extract optimal care from the surrogates. But, most essentially it can be argued that sub-optimal care is 
obvious given the surrogates must feel a level detachment towards the fetus in order to keep a 
professional attitude and that she is not adequately compensated.  
Moreover, a social stigma operates in the Indian scenario. The society at large cannot see a woman 
impregnated by any means else than that is ordained by the laws of nature. This depreciates the perception 
of the surrogates about their own social worth. They cannot feel proud of what they are participating in. 
They would feel empowered and respectable if only they were perceived as ‘valuable’, if they were let to 
know how much gratitude the Commissioning couples feel towards them. This is a missing factor that 
influences the surrogates’ emotion in a fashion that keeps them from optimally participating in these 
projects. This industry is bound to suffer from a cycle of low investments….flowing back and forth 
between the Commissioning couple and the surrogates. 
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Surrogates at risk: 
It has been seen that in many cases it is purely the monetary compensation paid to the surrogates 
that lures poor women into taking all kinds of risks, risks that they know little of.  Majority of 
these women are illiterate enough to understand the exact terms and consequences of the contract 
they sign. This is clear from reports that claim that surrogates agree to take all efforts to protect 
the fetus even at the cost of their health, and even willing to be "sustained with life-support 
equipment" to protect the fetus15. Often, the medical community is accused of neglecting the 
health of the surrogate all together. Their focus and liability being only the delivery of a healthy 
child to the commissioning couple. “The highly secretive and largely unregulated 
baby factories (many of which are dressed up as legitimate IVF Clinics) now mushrooming all 
over India are usually only concerned with the end product: the child”16. To give an example we 
cite the case of Premila Vaghela, a poor 30-year-old surrogate who died during her pregnancy. 
The foetus, eight-months old and premature, was secured through an emergency caesarian 
section delivery. Since, the contract had no terms to offer risk coverage in case of the surrogate’s 
death, the surrogacy agency was not liable to offer any compensation owing to her death. The 
agency paid off the amount owing to the successful birth of the baby, keeping her family from 
registering any complaints against them.  
       Thus one can cite umpteen examples where women who offer their wombs for rent may not 
fully see or internalize the risks involved, but they are somewhat happy to realize their personal 
expectations. For many this is a source of bulk income required to buy a house, or educate their 
children, or may be secure medical care for their ill husband.  “…….as for the women who bear 
                                                        
15
 Refer to the report available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/05/india-surrogates-
impoverished-die. 
16For detailed report follow The Guardian, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/05/india-surrogates-impoverished-die. 
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the children of others, they earn for them a hefty fee of about $8,000 — enough to buy a house 
— while their husbands might toil away for $40 a month.”17. But the ultimate fallout of the 
system is a cycle of low child specific investments………the market do not attract educated 
women, who might have better awareness, and healthier lifestyle habits fit to carry a healthy 
baby. As a consequence, women’s health as well as the new-born child’s is sufficiently at 
jeopardy to doubt the sustainability of this industry in the long run. 
                      With this in mind we proceed with our analysis as follows. In section 3 we describe 
the baseline model of gestational surrogacy contracts with a pair of intended parents and a poor 
surrogate. We show that simple economic rationale per se can explain the inherent 
underinvestment in these sorts of industries. Section 4 discusses an alternative model formulation 
which is isomorphic to the baseline model. Section 5 concludes our paper.  
 
3. The Baseline Model: 
Following Banerjee (2013) we explore an interaction between a set of ‘intended parents’ and a 
‘surrogate mother’ (gestational carrier) who will be willing to bear their child through In-vitro 
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer (i.e. IVF-ET). Both the intended parents and the surrogate are 
assumed to be risk neutral. We assume that the intended parents are otherwise medically capable 
in the sense that the husband has normal sperm count and the wife capable of producing normal 
ovum. But because of certain medical problems18 the wife is incapable of carrying a baby till 
term and therefore need a surrogate to have a biological baby. After in-vitro fertilization the 
                                                        
17
 Find the detailed report at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kylesmith/2013/10/03/pregnancy-got-you-down-no-
problem-outsource-your-babymaking-to-india/ 
 
18
 Problems like (i) hysterectomy (ii) absence or malformation of uterus, since birth (iii) diabetes, multiple sclerosis, 
heart and kidney diseases (iv) repeated miscarriages. See section 1 of Banerjee and Basu (2006) for details. Also see 
Banerjee (2013) 
9 
 
embryo is transferred to the gestational surrogate the surrogate starts taking care of the unborn 
child. Delivery takes place after the biological gestation period is over. Therefore similar to 
Banerjee (2013) the intended parents provide the genetic material (biological parents) of the 
baby and the surrogate is only a gestational carrier19. We assume that the property right of the 
baby remains with the intended parents and the surrogate is supposed to hand over the baby to 
the intended parents after everything is successfully completed20. Alternatively the intended 
parents can choose to adopt, if they do not want to remain childless. To focus sharply on 
surrogacy, we make a simplifying assumption that the intended parents prefer a genetic child to 
an adopted one. This does not affect the qualitative aspect of our paper. 
       The structure of the game is as follows. The intended parents approach a prospective 
surrogate and offer a state contingent contract. We assume that the intended parents are supposed 
to pay   if the project succeeds, i.e. the Intended Parents are delivered a healthy baby. If the 
project fails then the surrogate is paid  where  > . Failure can be interpreted as having an 
unhealthy baby or a still baby or otherwise. Therefore we specifically assume a generalized 
incentive structure {, } contingent on the outcome of the project. We assume that a limited 
liability constraint operates which ensures that a surrogate cannot be paid a negative amount, i.e. 
 ≥ 0. Since, surrogates are endowed with little or no wealth at all, we may expect this limited 
liability to operate, i.e., she must not be penalized for a bad outcome21. After the contract is 
offered the surrogate starts taking care of the unborn child22. The surrogate’s care is represented 
                                                        
19
 Therefore without loss of generality we focus on gestational surrogacy and other forms of surrogacy can be easily 
accommodated in our model with slight modifications. 
20
 ICMR guidelines in India Support this assumption.  
21
 Also one interpretation can be that she must be covered for all expenses (medical or otherwise) made for her 
pregnancy and therefore she should at least be paid  > 0, for simplicity we can normalize the minimum amount 
payable to 0.  
22
  If she accepts the contact and at the equilibrium it can be shown that she will.  
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by  which is the surrogate’s effort in this case. Effort is costly and the cost is given by  . Effort 
of the surrogate is not observable and hence not contractible. After the gestation period is over 
outcome of the process is realized. The outcome can be ‘high’ which is nothing but the birth of a 
normal child and we denote it by  = 1. The outcome might also be ‘low’ which can be 
interpreted as failure of the surrogacy process (might lead to a birth of a defective baby or a 
‘still’ baby or otherwise) that can be denoted as  = 023. The outcome is observable and hence 
contractible. In case of success the intended parents get a fixed utility  > 0 from having a 
biological baby and gets 0 if the process fails. We assume that that the surrogate is altruistic and 
receive a non-pecuniary benefit (warm-glow) of  from successfully helping out the intended 
parents where 0>λ . If 1>λ  then the surrogate is very altruistic and derives more pleasure than 
the intended parents. Also we assume for simplicity that in case of a failure the surrogate does 
not get any altruistic pleasure. The surrogate is assumed to have an outside option denoted by 
 > 0. We summarize the timeline of the game below: 
The Time line: 
1. The Intended Parents approach a surrogate, about whom they are well informed regarding 
the intensity of the surrogate’s altruistic feelings for the couple before they offer a 
contract.  
2. The Intended Parents offer an outcome contingent contract { , } , with  being offered 
only after the successful delivery of a normal baby,  is paid in case of failure.  
3. The surrogate accepts or rejects the contract. The game ends if she rejects the contract. 
4. After both parties agree IVF-ET takes place and the surrogate starts taking care of the 
unborn child.  
                                                        
23
 Therefore without loss of generality we focus on a 0-1 outcome.  
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5. After the period of gestation, delivery takes place and payments are settled depending on 
the according to the terms of the contract.  
  Given the above structure the Intended Parent’s (IP) surplus function is given by  
                                  = . "  − $ + &1 − '. "−$ 
Or,                             = . ( −  " −  $) −                                                                         (1) 
The surrogate’s expected pay-off can be written as  
                                * = . & + ' + &1 − '.    −  2⁄                 
Or,                           * = . [.  + " − $] +  −  2⁄                                                           (2) 
 
The Optimal Contracting Problem: 
First we examine the situation when the effort of the surrogate is contractible. Optimal effort in 
the absence of any informational asymmetry will be chosen so as to maximize the expected joint 
surplus of the intended parents and the surrogate. However the contract offered to the surrogate 
will have no allocative role in this situation. Therefore under the first best, the optimization 
problem becomes 
                                       ./0∈[2,3]4 = . &1 + ' −

                                                                      (3) 
 The optimal first best monitoring effort will be ∗ = &1 + '. The maximized first best joint 
surplus will therefore be 4∗ = &367'8 . The first best monitoring effort and the optimal first best 
joint surplus increases with the altruism of the surrogate. 
Now we examine the situation where the effort of the surrogate is unobservable and hence non-
contractible. Therefore the optimal contracting problem of the intended parents can be 
represented as the following maximization problem:  
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                                               ./09:,:;  = . ( − " −  $) −                                            (4)  
Subject to the following constraints:  
(i). The participation constraint of the surrogate stating that she must at least receive her outside 
option: 
                                             . " −   + $ +  −   2⁄  ≧                                              (PCS) 
(ii). The incentive compatibility constraint of the surrogate stating that she chooses the effort 
level that maximizes her expected payoff: 
                                    = /=> ./0̂   9̂. [.  + " −  $] +   −  ̂ 2⁄ ;                              (ICS) 
which can be rewritten as  
                                                *@ = [.  +  " −  $]                                                             
     (iv). The limited liability constraint of the surrogate 
                                                ≧ 0                                                                                          (LLS) 
Incorporating the above incentive compatibility constraint the optimal contracting problem can 
be represented as follows: 
                                          ./0 9:,:;  =  &1 − '" − $ − " −  $ +  −                                                         
Subject to 
                                                
":A :67.8$
 +  ≧                                                                                          
                                                   ≧ 0                                                                                                
First we consider the case where the outside option of the surrogate is very low such that the 
participation constraint does not bind. In this situation it is optimal for the intended parents to set 
 = 0  keeping " −  $ unchanged. So fixing  = 0  the optimum " −  $ can be found by 
simply maximizing the intended parents’ expected payoff subject to " −  $ and we get         
13 
 
" −  $ = &3A7'.8 . Therefore the optimal contract in this range will be B =
&3A7'8
 ,  = 0 C which 
is, in essence, a share-type contract and the optimal effort in this situation will be *@ = &367'.8  
which is less than the first best. Plugging in the values of  and  in the participation constraint 
we get the restriction  < &367'E . If  belongs to this range then the PC of the surrogate 
doesn’t bind and therefore we can ignore the participation constraint. 
        For intermediate values of   such that &367'E  ≤  <
&367'
 , both the participation 
constraint and the limited liability constraint will bind and the optimal contract is found by 
solving both the participation and the limited liability constraints, and we get  = G2.  − .  
and  = 0 and the optimal effort is given by ∗ =  G2.  and since  < &367'  the optimal 
effort is always less than the first best. The intended parents will have non-negative payoff in this 
situation. 
 For higher values of  such that  ≥ &367' , the participation constraint will bind but the 
limited liability will not bind. The optimal contract can be found in the following way. Since 
PCS binds, substitute,  from PCS into   and we get 
                                        =  " −  $ − ":A :$

 +
78&67'
 −     
Maximizing this expression with respect to " −  $, we get " −  $ = , which in essence is 
nothing but a fixed rent contract that makes the surrogate the residual claimant and the optimal 
effort will be at the first best level &1 + '. But what happens to the intended parents’ payoff? 
Plugging " −  $ =  into the intended parent’s payoff we get  = − < 0. Therefore it is not 
possible for the intended parents to have positive payoff when  > &367'  and therefore it is 
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not optimal for the intended parents to offer such a contract and therefore optimal first best effort 
cannot be achieved. Technically put, this is the situation where one can possibly offer a fixed 
rent contract but this is not possible since the surrogate cannot compensate the intended parents 
when the process fails. Therefore making the surrogate residual claimant is not possible as that 
will hurt the intended parents and they will end up with negative payoff. The above findings can 
be stated in the following result: 
Proposition 1: 
(a). If  < &367'E , then the optimal contract is B =
&3A7'8
 ,  = 0 C which is in essence a 
share-type contract. Optimal incentive pay falls with surrogates’ altruism. Optimal effort is less 
than the first best. 
(b). For &367'E  ≤  <
&367'
 , the optimal contract is B = G2.  − . ,  = 0 C. Optimal 
incentive pay increases with surrogates’ outside option but falls with surrogates’ altruism. 
Optimal effort is always less than the first best. 
Proof: Follows from the above discussion. QED 
The above result theoretically formalizes the argument that in the Indian market where 
surrogates come from poor background and doesn’t have any wealth; suboptimal care will be an 
inherent feature. The fact that the property rights of the baby lies with the intended parents and it 
is not optimal for the intended parents to incentivize the surrogate appropriately to elicit the first 
best effort. Given that the optimal contract in this situation is a share-type contract, we in the 
next section construct a model of share-type contract and try to find to optimal shares in such a 
scenario. 
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4.  Alternative Model Specification: The Share Contract: 
In the previous section we have assumed that the Intended Parents offer the surrogate an 
outcome contingent contract {, }. It has already been shown that starting from a general 
incentive structure, the optimal incentive contract resembles a share contract. Given this, in this 
section, we take a step forward and examine the optimal share contract that the intended parents 
will offer the surrogate and we show that the two specifications are largely isomorphic.  
               Therefore we assume that the Intended Parents offer a share contract {F, α}, where F is 
offered irrespective of the outcome of the project and α denotes a share of utility gain (the money 
equivalent) enjoyed by the Intended Parents from having the baby. All other notations resemble 
those used in the previous section. Also, the pay-off structure used in the earlier model is 
retained. 
Thus, the Intended Parent’s (I.P) surplus function is given by  
                                  = . &  − H' −  I                                                                               (6) 
And the surrogate’s expected payoff will be 
                             * = I + . & H + '.  −  2⁄  ≧                                                               (7) 
The Optimal Share-type Contract: 
The optimal first best contract will be the same as in the previous case. When the surrogate’s 
effort is non-contractible, the optimal contracting problem of the intended parents can be 
represented as the following maximization problem:  
                                               ./0{J,K}  = . &  − H' −  I                                                 (8)  
Subject to the participation constraint  
                                               * = I + . & H + '.  −  2⁄  ≧                                             (9)        
The incentive compatibility constraint: 
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                                              *.@ = /=> ./0̂  {̂. & H + '.  − ̂ 2⁄ }                                   (10)                                  
                                                      =   & H + '.   
And the limited liability constraint of the surrogate 
                                                 I ≧ 0,                                                                                        (11)         
Internalizing the incentive compatibility constraint the optimal contracting problem reduces to: 
                                      ./0{J ,K}& H + '&1 − H' − I             
      Subject to                                            
                                      I + & K67'.8  ≧                                                                                              
                                      I ≧ 0                                                                                                               
The solution is similar to the previous model. This model is found to be isomorphic to the 
previous model. 
Depending on the value of  there can be two cases:  
(i).  is not so high such that participation constraint doesn’t bind. 
(ii).  is sufficiently high such that the participation constraint binds.  
A third case is found to exist for very high , where a contract with each agent agreeing to 
participate does not exist. This case seems to restore the first-best outcome, yet either of the 
agent or the principal is bound to be left with a negative surplus. We simply ignore this case. 
And similar to the previous model we find that sub-optimality is an inherent feature of this 
market the way it has been structured here. 
We characterize the optimal contracts in both the above cases separately: 
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Case1: Participation constraint doesn’t such that  < &367'E .  
For very low  , the participation constraint doesn’t bind. The Intended Parents may offer lower 
F until at least the Limited Liability binds. Thus, it is optimal for the intended parents to set 
I∗ = 0. This does not affect the effort of the surrogate and hence can be justified. The intended 
parents will optimally choose H so as to ./0K  &H + '. &1 − '.   and we get the following 
result: 
Proposition 3:   Suppose  < &367'E    holds. 
A. The intended parents will offer H∗ = 3A7  fraction of their satisfaction (money equivalent) 
to the surrogate as incentive bonus in case of success. The optimal share decreases with 
the altruism of the surrogate. 
B. The optimal fixed fee offered by the intended parents will be  I∗ = 0.  
C. The optimum effort of the surrogate will be ∗ = &367' .  which less than the first best 
effort. The optimal effort increases with surrogates’ altruism. 
 
Case2:  &367'

E  ≤  <
&367'
 : 
In this situation  is sufficiently high such that the participation constraint binds. Therefore in 
this case the solution will be determined both by the binding incentive compatibility and the 
participation constraint of the surrogate. Thus solution to the optimal contract in this situation is 
as follows: 
Proposition 3: Suppose   ∈ L 3 M
367
 N
 . , &367'.8  O holds. Then the optimal contract is 
characterized as follows: 
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A. The intended parents will offer the surrogate H∗ = GP8 − . The optimal share increases 
with the surrogate’s outside option  and falls with surrogate’s altruism.  
B. The optimal fixed fee offered to the surrogate is I∗ = 0. 
C. The surrogate’s optimal effort is *@ =  G2 and it is less than the first best. Optimal 
effort increases with the surrogate’s outside option but is independent of the level of the 
surrogate’s altruism. 
The explanation of the Proposition 2 and 3 is similar to Propositions 1 made in our previous 
model. The results are exactly identical; as this model is isomorphic to the baseline model. 
Therefore the upshot of the analysis is that if the surrogate is sufficiently poor and doesn’t have 
any wealth and also given that the property right of the baby lies with the intended parents, the 
surrogate will always take suboptimal care during gestation and that might be detrimental to the 
wellbeing of the baby.   
 
5. Conclusion: 
              In the expanding reproductive tourism industry in India, financially needy women offer 
themselves as surrogates. They have very little wealth, very little education and therefore little 
health awareness. Indian surrogates are one of the lowest paid in this market across the globe. 
There is no legal homogeneous scheme of payments made to the surrogate. 24 Often it has been 
argued that since the surrogates are mainly motivated by financial incentives, there is an 
possibility that the surrogates might take suboptimal child specific care during gestation and 
therefore the unborn child might be at risk.  Our paper attempts to give a theoretical explanation 
                                                        
24
 Often the particular nature of the payment is reimbursement of the maintenance costs (paid monthly) plus a lump 
sum transfer after the parental rights are transfer red to the Commissioning Couple. 
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to this logic and shows that with the surrogate having no wealth, at the optimum, the surrogate 
will indeed put in suboptimal effort. Using the classic hidden action framework we show that 
with limited or no wealth of the surrogate, it is never optimal for the intended parents to make 
the surrogate a residual claimant and therefore every commercial surrogacy contract will be in 
essence a share contract where it is optimal for the surrogate to put in suboptimal effort. 
Therefore eliciting first best effort is ruled out.25 
                 In Banerjee (2013) risk neutral agents put in suboptimal effort even in the absence of 
limited liability and that was due to ‘social ignominy’ modeled in that paper. Our paper assumes 
away the role of social ignominy. Yet, even without social ignominy, as shown here, the second-
best effort is always lower than the first-best even with risk-neutral agents. There is no way that 
the first-best effort may be implemented within the given set of feasible contracts. Thus, this 
paper gives a different rationale for the existence and persistence of suboptimal care in the rent-
a-womb’ market in India. 
                   An important issue open to further research is to incorporate the moral hazard 
incentives of the intended Parent in addition to the moral hazard incentive of the surrogate. Thus 
far, we have only focused our attention on the surrogate’s moral hazard and abstracted from the 
Intended Parent’s moral hazard. Therefore one can have a two-way moral hazard model where 
both the intended Parent and the surrogate’s actions are subject to moral hazard. Moreover, in 
this paper we have assumed away any third party intervention or intermediation (such as 
infertility clinics) in surrogacy arrangements. In future we plan to examine the role of infertility 
clinics and optimal contracts in that scenario. Finally, one can also consider the discrete effort 
case and check whether our results go through in that structure also. 
 
                                                        
25
 Banerjee , Gertler and Ghatak (2002) 
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